INTRODUCTION

(i)

INTRODUCTION

I introduce here reasons why the British Government, refuse to enact corrections within their legal system, legal rulings concerning the transsexual. This involves not only internal English Law, but the European Community Resolution 1117 1989 of the European Parliament. I specifically demand that the United Kingdom follow this resolution as other European Community Countries have already done so to date. This resolution also places demands on other European Community Countries and their internal laws. European Community Countries do recognise Resolution 1117,that was passed by the European Parliament to make specific demands for the legal and Human Rights of transsexuals to be respected and written into the internal laws of the Member States of the European Comm unity. But the United Kingdom always refers back to an outdated divorce case, namely Corbett.v.Corbett.

In the next pages I will explain the misuse of the Corbett case by the British Government, and the British Governments refusal to enact into their legal system the demands contained within, Resolution 1117,passed by the European Parliament. Also how the case was misinterpreted by the legal representatives, of the Plaintiffs, Rees and Cossey in their cases to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Whose cases are relevant to my own case.

I present to the Commission further material in relation to the complaint I lodged with you on the 16th August 1993.

In this material I shall present to you unknown factors that were relevant to, two previous cases, those of Rees v United Kingdom, and Cossey v United Kingdom. These factors involve the material, which the United Kingdom presented in their memorial in Rees v United Kingdom and Cossey v United Kingdom. That material being the defence of the British Government as to why they felt that they should not make amendments to the birth certificate of a post-operative transsexual, and why they created the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, which forbids a post-operative transsexual from entering into a matrimonial contract.

1. Corbett.v.Corbett: This was a simple divorce case that took 16 days to consider, between 1969-1970. The petition itself, with the evidence that was clearly available at the time, would have taken ten minutes for the judge to have made his conclusions, that the marriage between April Ashley and Arthur Cameron Corbett was illegal by its contract, and therefore void.

What emerged from the case was irrelevant and had nothing to do with the petition presented by Arthur Cameron Corbett. But we must look deeper into this case, and we can see underlying motives as to why this case took 16 days and not 10 minutes.

Arthur Cameron Corbett was Lord Rowallen, son of and heir to the title and estates of his Father, Baron Rowallen. April Ashley was born George Jamieson, son of Frederick Jamieson, a tram conductor. Arthur Cameron Corbett, being a titled Lord of the Realm, was a man who belonged to a club known as the Aristocracy. Being a titled Lord gave him the privilege of a seat in the House of Lords, which is the Upper House of the British Parliament. The marriage between him and April Ashley, (who was an ex transsexual) caused many questions publicly and in the Arena of Parliament. Notably as well by other Peers of the Realm in the House of Lords. Such a state of affairs was not conducive to the image of The Lords of the Realm. That sat in the House of Lords. By testimony in the case itself, it was noted that the contract of marriage between Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley had never had any basis of a love relationship between a man and a woman. His relationship to April Ashley was one based on fantasy. The fantasy being one that concerned his transvestite desires. April Ashley being the person who represented for him the image he desired to look like. After the inevitable break up of the marriage and only through advice from close associates did he place a petition to the Courts demanding a decree of nullity to the marriage.

That petition created an open doorway, because it was an infamous marriage, to intervention by Parliament and the House of Lords within the judiciary. This involved placing a judge selected by those in Parliament and the House of Lords in a position to hear the case. Certain other people were also selected, notably medical experts such as Professor John Dewhurst and Dr Randell, to give their medical opinion. A contrived conclusion had to be reached, that was detrimental to April Ashley, and any other transsexual, concerning their rights, legal recognition and their right to enter

Into a contract of marriage A decision had to be given whereby the British Government would be able to make a new marriages Act through Parliament that would go into the law books and effectively become part of the law of the land.

We must now look at the case itself.

The Petition: This was a petition by Arthur Cameron Corbett praying for a declaration that the ceremony of marriage which took place in Gibraltar on the 10th September 1963 between himself and the respondent then known as April Ashley was null and void and of no effect because the respondent at the time of the ceremony was a person of the male sex.

This is the petition, and we should study its wording. The presiding Judge, 0rmrod. J had only to look at the written evidence of the marriage certificate and the persons involved. The marriage certificate states quite clearly that the marriage took place on the 4th September 1963 and not as stated in the petition, 10th September. The marriage certificate states that April Ashley was a spinster. If the presiding judge had cared to look at the birth certificate of April Ashley it would have been immediately seen that she was horn George Jamieson, a boy, with no legal amendment to that certificate stating that she was April Ashley, a girl. Therefore we can see that the date of the marriage in the petition was wrong, and her condition as stated in the marriage Certificate, a spinster, was incorrect in relation to her unamended birth certificate. A spinster being an unmarried woman. April Ashley was at the time still legally George Jamieson, a bachelor, meaning an unmarried man. Arthur Cameron Corbett's birth certificate shows him as also a boy at birth, at the time of the marriage a man. It was clear on that evidence alone that legally both parties were supposedly of the male sex and the marriage was automatically void, under existing law at the time, with no more ado on the matter.

But, the Judge, instead of adhering only to the known facts of the petition went beyond those facts, and by doing so broke, what is known in English Law, as the Rules of The Supreme Court, Ultra Verus, and creating a situation of, Orbita Dicta, which means that his final ruling was void by having broken the Rules of The Supreme Court, which would mean a new case. This can be seen, in that the written petition stated further;

'' Or in the alternative, for a decree of nullity on the grounds that the marriage was never consummated owing to the incapacity or wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate it"

The very wording, "or in the alternative", is where Judge Ormrod. J exceeded his powers as a judge in a simple open and shut divorce case.

There was no alternative to consider, as there was ample evidence that showed the marriage to have never had any validity in its beginning. Arthur Cameron Corbett knew of April Ashley's background, and the very act of him having procured a special licence to enter into a marriage with her in Gibraltar was breaking English Law, namely the Perjury Act 1911.3(c). 'If any person, for the purpose of procuring a marriage or a certificate or licence for marriage, knowingly and wilfully makes a false oath or makes or signs a false declaration, notice or certificate required under any Act relating to marriage, he is guilty of an offence under section 3.(1). of the Perjury Act 1911'. A marriage abroad would not be liable to prosecution under the Perjury Act, but, Gibraltar was British Territory and came under British Law and Jurisdiction, and that is where

the marriage took place, and where the licence was procured. Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley were liable to prosecution under that Act, though it is odd to say, that this question never arose in the proceedings of the case, which creates a question, Why? The answer can be seen as very simple. As I stated before, Arthur Cameron Corbett's position in relation to the House of Lords and Parliament was as such that a way had to be found to deliberately annul post operative transsexuals rights in the eyes of the law. To bring the Perjury Act into the case would lead away from the desired course the Government had in mind.

The rest of the case places much of the onus on medical opinions of the time, and also shows the attitude of Judge Ormrod J, not to have taken the stance of a judge who was impartial, but on the contrary much of his statements were of a discriminatory nature against April Ashley, and his decision to use the opinions of only Professor John Dewhurst and Dr Randell out of a total of 9 medical witnesses as de facto medical evidence for all time.

It is also notable that April Ashley asked for estopment in the case, but this was .not granted, if it had been, then the judgement that resulted could not have been used for the purpose it was to be created for, and so they proceeded.

April Ashley denied that she was of the male sex at the time of the marriage, though for many years she had been regarded as such. This can be corroborated by her unamended birth certificate, but this cannot implicitly say she was not female, as I shall elucidate later.

Judge Ormrod. J, in evaluating the petition himself stated. "The case therefore resolves itself into the primary issue of the validity of the marriage, which depends on the true sex of the respondent". The judge, as I have stated must, have been aware of the birth certificates of both parties, as that was the logical evidence to see, what were the petitioner and respondents legal sex. But he chose to go further as he continued his evaluation by stating, "and the secondary issue of the incapacity of the parties, or their respective willingness or unwillingness to consummate the marriage, if there was a marriage to consummate". As I have stated, where legal validity was concerned, there was no marriage to consummate. As April Ashley had not, had her birth certificate amended, an amendment as such would have given her the legal status of being female, where marriage was concerned.

We can note that a medical background of the respondent, April Ashley, was put forward, though in a very unfavourable light. That at the age of 17was referred (as a supposed boy) by his general practitioner to the psychiatric department of the Walton hospital, Liverpool, to the medical care of Dr Vaillant, a consultant psychiatrist. A medical examination was made by an assistant doctor who stated that George Jamieson (to become later April Ashley) presented a womanish appearance and had little bodily and facial hair, but no other physical abnormality. Dr Vaillant in his opinion, stated that, he had little doubt that George Jamieson was a boy. That was 40 years ago, and little was known in the medical world about the transsexual. Dr Vaillant gave a report to the general practitioner of George Jamieson stating. "This boy is a constitutional homosexual who says he wants to become a woman. He has had numerous homosexual experiences and his homosexuality is at the root of his depression. On examination, apart from his

womanish appearance there was no abnormal findings". Most doctors at that time would not really know the difference between a transsexual and a homosexual, as can be seen by that statement.

The case goes on to give a short history as to how George Jamieson worked in hotel's, then into show business, and started hormone treatment, leading up to an operation in Casablanca, for the creation of a vagina by a re-known surgeon called Dr Burou. Who it seems refused to supply any information of his work to the court. After which a change of name was made to April Ashley.

The petitioner, Arthur Cameron Corbett described his life as sexually unhappy and abnormal. His desires to parody women, by occasionally dressing as one in private, which is transvestism, though he was never happy with his appearance in the mirror, as it was not what he would have liked himself to look like. This led to him having homosexual experiences with other men, and entering the world of female impersonators, through which he was put in contact with April Ashley. He was aware that April Ashley had been born with some form of male genitalia, but had undergone a sex change operation. April Ashley was for him what he would liked to have seen himself as, on viewing himself in the mirror, during one of his incursions into transvestism. He then became obsessed with her over the corning years, though, it seems, did not feel much affection for him, let alone to enter into a marriage, neither had it seems, had any physical sexual activity taken place between them.

Judge Ormrod J, stated, "that in his opinion the relationship between April Ashley and Arthur Cameron Corbett had little in common with any heterosexual relationships which he could recall hearing about". What exactly was this man hinting at? The most obvious can only come to mind. April Ashley had already been more or less called a constitutional homosexual in the proceedings, by a psychiatrist in the court. Judge Ormrod. J .was already showing a bias, as a Judge in the case, but then that was his role to play in this case. It must also be noted, that April Ashley had not only changed her name by Deed Poll, having a Passport issued in that name, but had obtained a womans insurance card from the Ministry of National Insurance, and was treated as a women for National Insurance purposes. The fact that she was treated legally as a woman for such purposes as employment, and in later years to come, meant that she would have been given a Pension at the age of 60 as any other woman, and not as of a man at the age of 65. But this case was deliberately created to end such a practice once and for all. It must be noted that April Ashley had tried to persuade the Superintendent Registrar to change her birth certificate but had failed. Here we see a connection to this case, namely the Births end Deaths Act of 1953. That connection was to be used as a future reference with a contrived judgement in this case. It meant the death knell for any existing transsexual and those to come, where the law, their legal and human rights were concerned, and to place them in the realm of those suffering from a psychiatric illness and a delusion of the mind.

The marriage between April Ashley and Arthur Cameron Corbett, it seems, was not one of total mutual agreement between them. April Ashley up to that time had shown little interest in this man, but it seems that he wooed her with his title and money. We must note also that Arthur Cameron Corbett was the one who applied for a special marriage licence in Gibraltar, after which he discussed financial arrangements with her. What exactly were these financial arrangements, and what else did he promise her? We can only assume, if they were spoken of in the case they were deleted from the Law Report. But with the knowledge we have of the background of these two people a very clear picture emerges. Arthur Cameron Corbett was to be no other than Lord Rowallen and Heir to his Fathers estates (Baron Rowallen Peer of the Realm). His marriage to her would automatically make her Lady Rowallen, and give her financial rights. It seems that these were the financial arrangements and a wonderful prospect for her future. But April Ashley had to weigh the gains and the losses from such a union, and the realities, especially the social and legal implications. It seems from the evidence of the case that she was reluctant to go through with this marriage, and Arthur Cameron Corbett with his intense desire to have her as his wife and chattel, pressed her to go through with the marriage. In the end she decided to go through with it at the last moment.

The marriage itself never came to any union of a man and a woman, who had any mutual affection or love for each other. There were conflicting statements brought up in the case concerning the act of penetration. Arthur Cameron Corbett stated that April Ashley refused to have a sexual union with her. April Ashley stated that she did have a sexual union with him on several occasions, resulting in penetration, but he would immediately withdraw. It is at this point that Judge Ormrod.J, stated, "Again there is a conflict of evidence as to what took place between them, which I shall examine in more detail when I come to the issue of incapacity and wilful refusal". Here we come to the point in the case where, as I stated before, Ormrod .J. went beyond his powers as a judge and broke the Rules of The Supreme Court (Ultra Verus) creating a situation of� 0rbita Dicta, by not adhering to the Petition, "Praying for a declaration that the marriage that took place between himself, Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley, was nul1and void and of no effect because the respondent, Apri1 Ashley, was a person of the male sex". He went into the, "Alternative for a decree of nullity on the grounds that the marriage was never consummated, owing to the incapacity or wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate it".

From here on we shall see clearer why the rules of The Supreme Court were deliberately broken, and smoothed over, with the introduction of 9medical witnesses, why April Ashley was refused "Estopment" in the case, and a pre-ordained judgement came about and its consequences.

At a certain point in this disastrous marriage, about 3 months after the ceremony took p1ace, during which time it is stated, they only spent a total of 14 days together, April Ashley packed her bags and returned to London. She had realised that the marriage could not work out, and their legal and social position was very grim if not dangerous. She made this very clear in the letter she wrote to

6 him, after she arrived back in London. The letter, as has been shown in the Law Report concerning the case reads as follows:

11 Dec 1963 London

Dear Arthur, A letter from me. A none too happy one I�m afraid. I have thought and thought, not slept for days. But from all the pain and torture on my mind I see only one thing very clear. That is I will not ever he coming back to you. I do not know what I will do. I don't know how� I will live. But I know I won't be back.

The last three years have been the longest the unhappiest, the most horrible of my short twenty eight years. In these three years I have known you!!! So you must understand that although I don't put all the blame on you, you do seem to have been a terrible jinks to me.

I am paying dearly for my sin of marrying you. The worry and anguish I have felt in the past three years is making me ill. So the only thing I can do is to try to cut you out of my life completely. Then all I have are my earthly problems. A job a less expensive place to live. Arthur, don't think I expect any money from you I don�t. Because I know I should never have married you. But I do hope you will either let the house or pay whatever rent you think. At least that

Its so funny but I felt so much more (although I never really did) secure before I married you than I did after. Then you denying what you had promised me made me feel so sick to the stomach. I could never nave stood myself let alone you after words. �Then I seem to remember you trying to convince me of other lies of yours in the past. I don�t want to sound bitter, but I suppose I am a little. At the moment my life seems a wreck all over again. I hope this time I have a little more strength.

Arthur as I am quite a nice person I will say and do nothing about getting an annulment until you let me know. I can respect that you would not hurt your family any more with cheap publicity in that I hope should I ever want my freedom you will respect my wishes.

I hope you sell your land. In brief Arthur I hope one day you will find happiness. Although my heart is breaking I think you better have Mr Blue. Give my kindest thoughts to Rogelia, Pepe and Jose Luis.

God bless you,

April.

P. S. You have better address you C/of Caroline 73 Queen Gate as I will leave here in a few days.

It is very clear in her letter, to the man she reluctantly married, that he must have offered her a position in Society as the forthcoming Lady Rowallen to be and then later retracted his promise, and other promises he had apparently made, which she found out to be lies. As she stated in her letter. "Then I seem to remember you trying to convince me of other lies of yours in the past". What has already emerged is very clear, that Arthur Cameron Corbett's desire to marry April Ashley was that of a man whose sexual aberrations, were fuelled more by the knowledge that she had been born with male genitals. We are already aware of his obsession with transvestism and homosexuality.

He was a man who did not understand that April Ashley was born a transsexual and she found it necessary to have an operation to correct a biological mistake. As one of many uneducated people, he did not understand the difference between a transvestite and a transsexual. We also see from her letter that he had not only lied to her but many of his actions had hurt his family, something of which she wanted no part of. But instead of realising that she wanted no more to do with a man of perverse desires, he kept pestering her with letters trying to prolong an unwanted relationship.

In 1966 April Ashley demanded maintenance under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965. This it seems was owing to his reneging on some gift he gave her, that of the Villa at Marbella. Her maintenance claim as a means to enforce her claim to the property. Only after this did Arthur Cameron Corbett file for a divorce challenging the validity of the marriage.

The character of the man who lived in perverse fantasies, and more or less bullied and bribed with false promises, April Ashley into a marriage, which was doomed to failure, came out in his true colours. He could not have the fantasy he wanted so he set about to destroy her. By suing for divorce on the grounds that April Ashley was a man and not a woman. A despicable act, knowing that his social standing of being from an aristocratic family would weigh far more in his favour in a court of law than that of April Ashley. Who came from a working class family, and was unfortunate in her birth, in the biological sense, and that what was written on her birth certificate, that she was a boy, which had never been changed.

Medical examination of April Ashley took place by two Physicians appointed by the Court, which revealed that she had well-developed breasts and a vagina of ample size that would admit a normal erect penis. A chromosomal test was demanded then, to evaluate what was considered then a method to evaluate a person's sex. This evaluation today has proved not to be one hundred per cent correct, factual research has shown this. This investigation showed chromosome values that were considered for someone of the male sex.

The petitioner Arthur Cameron Corhett called on medical witnesses that were, officially recognised by the Government at the time, for the desired verdict. It can be seen that they were, as I will show later. The witnesses used by him to support his claims were, Professor C J Dewhurst, Professor of� Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Professor Dent, Professor of Human Metabolism and Dr J B Randell, Consultant Psychiatrist at Chaining Cross Hospital. It has been noted that Prof. Dewhurst was co-author of a book called, "The Inter-sexual Disorders", interested in cases which exhibit anomalies in the development of the sex organs. Dr Randell had made a study of individuals with abnormal psychological attitudes in sexual matters, particularly transvestites and transsexuals. Prof. Dewhurst and Dr Randell were working together with a plastic surgeon in their own treatment of transsexuals.

The respondent April Ashley called on Dr Armstrong, consultant Physician at Newcastle Infirmary, Professor Ivor Mills Prof. of

Medicine at Cambridge, and Professor Roth, Prof. of Psychiatry at the University of Newcastle-on-�Tyne. Dr Armstrong had written a number of papers on sex and gender problems, was co-editor of a well known book "Inter-sexuality in Vertebrates including Man". Professor Mills was interested in Endocrinology, cases of sex anomalies the study of chemical substances produced by the sex organs and other tissues in the body. Prof. Roth had experience of the psychological aspects of such people.

It was agreed that the evidence put forward by the medical witnesses would he in the form of books, journals and articles instead of questions, as questions may inadvertently condition the answer and lead to misunderstanding, and would be easier for the counsel and the judge. Books, journals and articles em such a subject and their meanings are very easily misused in such a circumstance, and in this case were.

The evidence given mainly centred on transsexuals as being people who suffered from a psychological condition and no more, and did not respond favourably to any form of psychological treatment. Dr Randell and Prof. Dewhurst considered surgical operations as a method of relieving the patient's symptoms and to assist in the management of their disorder. The very use of the term patient suffering from a disorder, and suffering from a psychological disorder, clearly shows how little they really knew about the transsexual. They even demanded of a transsexual to sign a form which read, "I of� do consent to undergo removal of the male genital organs and fashioning of an artificial vagina as explained to me by.�.(surgeon). I understand it will not alter my male sex and that it is being done to prevent deterioration in my mental health.

(Signature of Patient)"

Such a demand to a transsexual is no more than blackmail. It is the same as administering electric shock treatment, which was a barbaric practice and no longer used. Gender Reassignment operations are to reassign the person to the sex they should be and not to relieve a mental disorder.

Dr Randell considered the respondent April Ashley is properly classified as a male homosexual transsexualist. There is no such thing. Homosexuality is something of a totally different nature. If� she were homosexual she would never have undergone hormone treatment and later a gender reassignment operation. If she were homosexual after such an operation she would not live her life in a heterosexual manner with a man, but with a woman instead. Prof. Dewhurst agreed with the description by Dr Randell and said the description, a castrated male would be correct".

Dr Armstrong's view that the evidence contained in the Walton Hospital was typical of a transsexual, and there was evidence to show that the respondent was not physically a normal male, but an example of inter-sex, and should be assigned to the female sex. Prof. Roth was in agreement and would not recommend that the respondent should attempt to live in society as a male. Judge Ormrod. J stated that he was less impressed by Prof. Roth's evidence than by

Dr Randell and Dr Armstrong, but preferred the evidence of Dr Randell.

The judge had to see the evidence of Dr Randell as more preferable for the judgement to come just as he was to prefer the evidence of Prof. Dewhurst. He was also very quick to discount the research, which had lead to the early findings that there was a distinct difference in the male and female brain. He stated. "The use of such phrases as male or female brain in this connection is apt to mislead owing to the ambiguity of the word brain. In the present context it refers to a particular group of nerve cells, but not to the seat of consciousness or of the thinking process. In my judgement, these theories have nothing to contribute to the solution of the present case."

How wrong he was, and a strange statement to come from a man who was a qualified doctor, had sat on a board of psychiatrists and had worked for the Government in the study of forensic science. If the brain is not the seat of consciousness, or of the thinking process where is it? An odd remark for a man who held such posts of high esteem.

He went on to state," I must now deal with the anatomical and psychological anomalies of the sex organs, although I think that this part of the evidence is of marginal significance only, in the present case. In other cases it may be of cardinal importance. All the medical witnesses accept that there are at least four criteria for assessing the sexual condition of an individual. These are:

(i) Chromosomal factors

(ii) Gonadel factors (i.e. presence or absence of testes or ovaries)

(iii) Genital factors (Including internal sex organs)

(iv) Psychological factors.

Present day, proven research findings show that Chromosomal, Gonadel, and Genital factors are not absolute proof. But never the less we shall see how this idea was used at the time.

Prof. Dewhurst stated, "We do not determine sex in medicine we determine the sex in which it is best for the individual to live" This is rather a contradictory statement to make after already having agreed with Dr Randell's description of April Ashley as, properly classified as a male homosexual transsexualist", adding himself, �the description castrated male would be correct". Judge Ormrod .J observed, of the four criteria as assessing the sexual condition of a person. "These criteria, are of course, relevant to, but do not necessarily decide the legal base of sex determination". Chromosomal factors were reviewed, Dr Randells opinion was one where would not give much weight in determining sex, on what he described as psychological factors. Dr Armstrong and Dr Roth were of a view to classifying transsexuals as cases of Inter-sex. Prof. Mills, an endocrinologist, was of the view that persons who had an abnormal balance of male and female hormones should be regarded as cases of lnter-sex, and considered there to be sufficient evidence that April Ashley was an example of this condition.

Judge Ormrod J viewed Prof. Mills assertions as based on what he saw April Ashley as, after she had undergone her operation. Another clear indication of biased judgement by Ormrod J suggesting

himself that she may have been a person who suffered from Klinefeltors Syndrome, which can be seen if a biopsy specimen of her testicles were viewed under a microscope, and then stating there was no evidence to point to this. A very astute observation, to make, considering that April Ashley had already had her operation some years previous. His remark clearly indicating that he was not prepared to listen to medical testimony that in any way supported evidence that April Ashley was not really of the male sex. Neither was he prepared to believe April Ashley's account, that she had spontaneous breast growth. I would note here, that the taking of oestrogen does not always promote breast growth. In many cases it helps, in some cases it awakens the person's natural development of breasts. This is what most likely occurred in April Ashley's case. But since Judge Ormrod J showed lack of any real knowledge of the transsexual, his remarks were again showing a bias against her, and summing up this point stated, "In the circumstances I am not prepared to accept her evidence that the development of the breasts was spontaneous".

Prof. Mills had attached much of his findings on noting what had turned up in the records at the Walton Hospital, where an examination of April Ashley, (then known as George Jamieson) had taken place years earlier, where it was observed that the patient had, "little bodily or facial hair". He was of the opinion that such a condition could not have been produced by the taking of oestrogen, neither were there signs of hair removal �electrolyses. Such a technique was in its early stages then, and most people who used this often suffered from burns. Dr Randell stated that he had seen transsexuals with no sign of facial hair. Judge Ormrod concluded, "Prof. Mills, I think was relying largely on his experience of attempting, unsuccessfully, to treat hirsute women with oestrogen. In my judgement, it would not be safe to draw any inferences from the absence of facial hair in an individual who had been closely associated with experienced female impersonators for a number of years".

It is clearly emerging that Judge �Ormrod's whole position as an unbiased judge has shown complete bias in favour of the petitioner Arthur Cameron Corbett, he was not prepared to accept medical evidence given in April Ashley's favour, but was prepared to accept medical opinions not in her favour, and in no uncertain terms calling her a liar.

Prof. Mills had referred to two tests carried out on April Ashley's urine, which indicated a female balance of hormones. One of� the tests was reported during the trial, at a laboratory in the University College Hospital, according to Ormrod J the results were different, but he does not state what the difference was. If the previous tests had indicated a female balance of hormones, later tests could not have shown any difference, they would have been the same. Prof.; Dewhurst stated that such a test required the collection of a 24 hour specimen of urine. Judge Ormrod J stated, "that as neither sample was collected under supervised conditions the respondent being merely asked to supply the specimens little significance can be attached to the results, particularly in a forensic as opposed to clinical a situation." Again we see Judge Ormrod placing dispersions on anything in April Ashley's favour.

Where such tests as done on urine samples are concerned, clinical conditions are not necessary during time of collection. This is done privately by the person in their own home, the results in the laboratory would be no different to such a collection done in a hospital.

Judge Ormrod J in his opinion ruled out Klinefelters Syndrome, and that the respondent should not he classified as a case of Inter-sex. It is very clear that he ruled that out, as it would not be conducive to his final judgement.

Judge Ormrod J concluded that "the respondent had been shown to have an XY chromosome and therefore to be of the male chromosomal sex. To have had testicles prior to an operation and therefore to he of male gonadal sex. To have had male external genitalia, therefore to be of male genital sex. It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth at the latest and cannot be changed by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondents operation, therefore cannot effect her true sex".

Judge Ormrod J stated that there was common ground between all the medical witnesses. This is not true, the only common ground where this was concerned, was his collusion with Prof. Dewhurst and Dr Randell. Previous to this Ormrod had already stated," These criteria are of course, relevant to, but do not necessarily decide the legal base of sex determination". His end judgement is a contradiction. At this point counsel for Arthur Cameron Corbett submitted, this established April Ashley was male and therefore the marriage void. But it was already known by Arthur Cameron Corbett that April Ashley's birth certificate stated she was born George Jamieson, boy, and had never been corrected, so should his counsel, and the proceedings of this case should never have covered the ground it did.

Counsel for the respondent contended this, and quite rightly for what this court was doing to her. "That the respondent should be classified medically, as a case of inter-sex, and that as the law knew only two sexes, male and female. She must be assigned to one or the other, which in her case must he female, and she should be regarded for all purposes as a woman. That assignment, was a matter for the individual and their doctor, and that the law ought to accept this as determining that person's sex. That it was illogical to treat the respondent as a woman for many social purposes, such as nursing her in a female ward in hospital, or National Insurance, and not to regard her as a woman for the purpose of marriage." Here we arrive at the judgement of Ormrod J that went far beyond a simple divorce case.

"It appears to be the first occasion on which a Court in England has been call on to decide the sex of an individual and consequently there is no authority which is directly to point." As I have stated in the beginning of this summary, the case was contrived for this very purpose, there was no law or legal authority, a new Parliamentary Act had to be passed concerning marriage, which

Would cancel out a post-operative transsexual's right to enter into a marriage contract. Estopment was denied to the respondent, so the case could not be used for other social purposes concerning a transsexual pre or post-operative, where legal definition of sex was concerned or to be used.

As he continued, "Now that it has been raised, this case is unlikely to be the last, in which the courts will he called upon to investigate and decide it. I must therefore approach the matter as one of principle. Over a very large area the law is indifferent to sex. It is irrelevant to most of the relationships, which give rise to contractual or tortious rights and obligations and to the greater part of the criminal law. In some contractual relationships e.g. life assurance and pension schemes, sex is a relevant factor in determining the rate of premium or contributions. It is relevant also to some aspects of the law regulating conditions of employment and to various State run schemes such as National Insurance, or to such fiscal matters as selective employment tax. It is not an essential determinant of the relationship in these cases because there is nothing to prevent the parties to a contract of insurance or pension scheme from agreeing that the person concerned should be treated as a man or a woman as the case may be. Similarly the Authorities if they think fit, can agree with the Individual that he shall he treated as a woman for National Insurance purposes as, in this case. On the other hand, sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage, because it is and always has recognised as the union of man and a woman. It is the institution on which the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse is an essential element.

There are some other relationships such as adultery, rape and gross indecency in which by definition, the sex of the participants is an essential determinant.

The question then becomes what is meant by the word woman in the context of a marriage. The criteria must, in my judgement be biological, for even the most extreme degrees of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance, which can exist in a person with male chromosomes male gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In other words the law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors criteria, chromosomal, gonadel and genital tests, if all three are congruent determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention. My conclusion therefore is that the respondent is not a woman for the purpose of marriage but a biological male and has been so since birth."

Judge Ormrod J came to the point of estoppment demanded by April Ashley's counsel and stated. "The suggestion that a ceremony, which is wholly ineffectual and void in the law, can be rendered effective between the actual parties by some species of estoppel would produce the anomalous result that any third party whose interests are affected by this marriage could at any time successfully challenge its validity relying on the admissions in the evidence given before me. This defence fails."

CONCLUSIONS OF CORBETT

Judge Ormrod J in his statement at the judgement said, "it was the first time a court in England had been called on to decide the sex of an individual. This was untrue, as he had only been called on to pronounce a marriage null and void and no more. He also stated that a case of this nature would not be the last and the matter was one of principle. That is why he was placed as judge on simple divorce case to give a judgement that, as I stated before, would open the way for a new Act of Parliament, to cancel out marriage rights to a transsexual and close the rights to have an amendment to their birth certificate. All this based on princip1e.

It opened the door for social discrimination against transsexuals to become quite legal such as determining rates of contributions in life assurance and pension schemes, that would he based upon a persons sex, as he described would be legitimate in the law. The unamended birth certificate would have to be produced to prove their sexual identity. Employment also came under this ruling, prior to this case this was not so.

The transsexual was also victimised where marriage was concerned. If a male to female transsexual was to have a relationship such as a marriage it would he regarded as a homosexual relationship and not as a heterosexual marriage. That in his view a male to female transsexual could not he regarded as a woman in marriage or the right to have a family. Sex was also a determining factor in rape and as such a transsexual can now be legally raped.

He demanded that the law had to adopt the three criteria of Prof. Dewhurst and Dr Randell, chromosomal, gonadel and genital tests to determine a person's sex for the purpose of marriage and ignore any operative intervention. To make sure that nobody could challenge his verdict, he denied estoppel, knowing full well that if he did allow estoppel his verdict could be challenged.

The enclosed annexes to this memorial, a copy of the marriage certificate between Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley and copy of April Ashley's unamended birth certificate, show quite clearly that what emerged in this case was totally unnecessary. The verdict as such was unsound and deliberately discriminating. After the judgement of this case the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act was passed by Parliament, concerning nullity, 11 C. 'That the parties are respectively male and female'. It is this Act which now precludes a transsexual from marriage.

The verdict of the Corbett Case has been used since for a variety of different cases that have no link to divorce. As has been shown in the Rees v United Kingdom case in 1985, where referral was made to Regina v Tan, a prostitution case, a retirement pensions case, White v British Sugar Corporation, (a discrimination case). Reference was also made to the Corbett case in Cossey v United Kingdom 1989, which shows how far an unsound judgement can he used. Reference was made to the Court of Appeal New South Wales Australia, in R v Harris and R v McGuinness 1988. When the Judge concluded, pertaining to Corbett and its use.

"Will have to give place to more modern navigational guides to voyages on the seas of problems thrown up by human sexuality" Reference was also given to a case in the USA, concerning a marriage. M T v JT 1976, where an attempt was made to use the Corbett doctrine, and the court rejected such a doctrine concluding-, "In this case the transsexuals gender and genitals are no longer discordant they have been harmonised through medical treatment. Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy. Consequently, plaintiff should be considered a member of the female sex for marital

purposes. It follows that such an individual would have the capacity to enter into a valid marriage. In so ruling we do no more than give legal effect to a fait accompli, based upon medical judgement and action, which are irreversible. Such recognition will promote the individuals quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way discerning� any social interest, principle of public order or precept of morality".

The British Government has used the verdict of Corbett as their defence, in connection to the Rees and Cossey cases in Strasbourg. The British Government was aware of how the Corbett case was set up. They were aware of the marriage certificate of the Corbett and Ashley marriage, and of the unamended birth certificate of April Ashley. They disclosed none of this to the High Court in Strasbourg. Instead they mislead the court and in effect told a lie to gain a judgement in their favour, in detriment to Rees and Cossey. Until now the attitude of the British Government concerning transsexuals is, "we won the Rees and Cossey cases and we do not have to make any changes to the existing system in the law as regards transsexuals". I demand that the Commission must look at Rees and Cossey cases in a new light in that, the case I am presenting on my behalf is one totally different to the Rees and Cossey cases. I have had an amendment made to my birth certificate through due, process of law with medical backing; I am legally a woman. Neither Rees or Cossey had attained that; the only similarity I have to them is that like them I am a British National. Though with the evidence I have shown here it can be seen that an unfair judgement was made in their cases.

I demand that the Corbett judgement must be abandoned in reference to my case. The Corbett verdict was as synonymous as a case of rotten fish amidst the good.

BIRTH CERTIFICATES.

I use here part of the evidence that was given By the British Government in Rees v United Kingdom and maintained in Cossey v United Kingdom.

The British Government contends that the birth certificate is a historical document and cannot be changed. They contend also that it constitutes an integral and essential part of the statistical study of the population and its growth, fertility, research etc. They contend it is a record of an event and shows the facts at birth, including the then name and surname and sex of the individual, which facts are unaffected by subsequent developments such as change of name, or a sexual reassignment operation.

They contend further that provision is made for alteration of the sex of a child in the Birth Register where there is evidence that the original entry was incorrect or where there is an omission from the register. They contend, the making of an alteration to the register would constitute a falsification of the facts contained in the register. They contend that the Government attaches importance to maintain accuracy of public records, birth register, and public interests weigh strongly against amendments or entry in such records, which would constitute a falsification of the facts therein.

1. The contention that the Birth Certificate is a historical document may well be justified on the grounds that it records only what was seen and thought of an infant at birth. But whether that is completely true at the time, may not he found to be completely true at a later stage. Therefore the record would show an inaccuracy.

2. The contention that it constitutes an essential study of population growth, medical, fertility and research can only give a true account of such when essential facts are recognised in their entirety. The non-recognition of the transsexual by the Government deletes an essential factor and therefore the account cannot he said to be true but inaccurate. 3. The contention that it records name, surname, and sex of an individual, which are unaffected by name change or a sexual reassignment operation are at odds with two factors. Change of forename and sex; have been changed on English Birth Certificates, years after the birth of the individuals concerned. That is at odds with resolution 1117.12.September. 1989, passed by the European Parliament, Article 2.(e) demands, judicial recognition; changing of the first name, correction of the sex in the Birth Certificate and Identification papers. This resolution corresponds to recommendation 1117 1989, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe article 11 (a) �the reference to the sex of the person concerned is to be rectified in the Register of Births and in the Identity papers.

4. The contention that provision is made for alteration of the sex of a child in the Birth Register where there is evidence of an incorrect entry or where there is an omission from the register is questionable. As I have already mentioned, changes to the Birth Certificate and the Register have already taken place, notably before the Births and Deaths Act, and after the Act was passed but before the verdict in Corbett v Corbett. I contend that the present situation in this area, involving transsexuals, was decided by that verdict.

5. The contention that the making of alteration to the Register would constitute a falsification of the facts contained in the Register, is a truth, if the original description were to he totally erased. If, the original inscription were to remain on the Birth Certificate, and an amendment concerning the forename and sex were added, through Judicial recognition, as demanded in resolution 1117 of the European Parliament, it would not constitute any falsification of the facts, neither in the Register, or of the person concerned. 6. The contention of the British Government attaching importance to the maintenance of the accuracy of public records and the Births Register and adding, that public interests weighed strongly against

Amendment's, which would constitute a falsification of the facts therein, is again questionable. If they attach so much importance to such accuracy, the fact of refusing to amend the register where necessary creates an inaccuracy in the registers to the detriment of the person concerned. Their addition of public interests weighing strongly against such amendments is purely hypothetical. Practical and legal amendment to a persons Birth Certificate are only of concern to the person involved, not the public.

I now present the evidence of English Birth Certificates that have, been amended.

1.Laura Maud Dillon, sex girl, born 1915, amended in 1944. Amendment on the entry of birth reads. "In entry NO. 54 col. 2 for Laura Maud, read �Lawrence Michael� and in col. 3 for girl read boy^, corrected on the 14th April 1 944 by me C E Weston Superintendent Register on production of a statutory declaration made 'John Burdon Cooper and Grace Eileen Beauchamp. The Birth Certificate as shown in the register reads now. Lawrence Michael Dillon, sex �boy, date of birth First of May 1915.

2. Robert Marshal Cowell, sex boy, born 1918, amended in 1951. Amendment on the entry of birth reads. "In NO 157 col. 2 for Robert 'Roberta' and column 3 for 'boy' read 'girl'. Corrected on the 17th May 1951 by me Philip.J.Stevens Supt Registrar on production of statutory declaration made by Dorothy Elizabeth Cowell and Charles Eugene Dusseau. The birth Certificate as shown in the Registers reads now, Roberta Elizabeth Cowell, sex girl, date of birth eighth April 1918.

3. George Edwin Turtle, sex boy, born 1923. Amended in 1960. Amendment on the entry of birth reads. In NO 283 col. 2 for �George Edwin� read �Georgina Carol� and col.3 for �boy� read �girl� corrected on the 1st July 1960 by me J H Davies Deputy Supt Registrar on production of statutory declaration made by Alexander Fanagich Cawadire Kenneth Walter and Alexander Randel Turtle. The birth certificate as shown in the registers reads now Georgina Carol Turtle, sex 'girl' date of birth twenty third March 1923.

In addition to the changed birth certificate of,�Georgina Carol Turtle�. I present a certified copy of her marriage certificate, which states that she was married on 13th October 1962 to Christopher Walter Henry Somerset.

It should he noticed on the changed birth certificate that the changes to the forenames and sex took place many years after the births took place. Laura Maud Dillon was 29 years of age when the name and sex was changed to read Lawrence Michael Dillon sex boy. The person in question was what we now term a transsexual, as the existence of the transsexual was known by some doctors in 1944, but they had a different name at that time for this phenomena. They also had surgical knowledge, crude as it may have been. Robert Marshal Cowell was 33 years of age when the name and sex was changed to read Roberta Elizabeth Cowell sex girl, another transsexual person.

George Edwin Turtle was 37 years of age when the name and sex was changed to read Georgina Carol Turtle sex girl. Another person who was transsexual

We now have another question concerning Birth Certificates amendments to these certificates, and the involvement of marriage. Of the three copies I have shown as evidence, it will be seen that one was amended in 1944 another in 1951. Those amendments were made before the 1955 Births and Deaths Act. The British Government have stated in the Rees and Cossey case "civil registration of births, deaths and marriages was statutorily established in England and Wales in 1837","improveraents made under the Consolidation of Enactment's (Procedure) Act 1949". The 1955 Act was just an act to consolidate Births, Deaths, and Marriages into one Act for England and Wales.

The third certificate shows that it was amended 7 years after the 1953 Births and Deaths Act. It is quite clear that it was possible for a transsexual to have their Birth Certificate amended. Not only for such an amendment to be made, but for that person to enter into a contract of Marriage with a person who was of the sex she had been considered at some point in her life, legally. By that amendment from boy to girl she was allowed to enter into a contract of marriage, that took place in the Hallowed Halls of a Church! , Not just a simple civil registers office.

The link to the British Governments refusal to enact provision for a transsexual to have their birth certificate amended, is the divorce case of Corbett v Corbett.

I have shown proof of a letter from the OPCS (Office of Population Census Surveys) dated 31 March 1992 where it was stated. "The Resolution concerning discrimination against transsexuals, like all Resolutions of the European Parliament, is not binding on the Member States of the European Community"

Other Member States of the European Community do recognise the rights of transsexuals, and do recognise the resolutions of the European Parliament, where basic Human Rights are concerned, and where their internal laws are deficient concerning such rights. The British Government will not put into practice Article 2 (e) of Resolution 1117 1989, because it would mean having to make void the verdict of Corbett v Corbett and amend the 1973 Marriages Act. As there is no possibility of the British Judicial System overturning the Corbett verdict, there is only one Court left to do so, and that is the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The decision by Judge Ormrod J in the Corbett case has created the framework for Human rights of transsexuals to he trampled on.

I now openly accuse the British Government of having lied in two Previous cases that went before the High Court in Strasbourg. Namely those of Rees v United Kingdom, case NO. 12.628 and Cossey v United Kingdom, case NO. 24.628. In both cases they never cited the truth behind the Corbett v Corbett judgement, but instead misused that judgement. They never told the full truth concerning the possibilities of an amendment being made to the birth certificate in the case of transsexuals after gender reassignment surgery. They also gave an outdated and biased medical opinion on transsexuality by Prof. John Dewhurst. I demand that a review now be made on the judgements concerning Rees and Cossey as those judgements cannot be held to be safe, in light of the evidence I have shown, concerning the Corbett case and birth certificates, which were relevant factors in both cases.

MEDICAL PROOF

As I have stated in my break down of the Corbett case, Judge Ormrod J decided, in his judgement to use four criteria for determining the sexual condition of an individual, which were;

i) Chromosomal Factors

ii) Gonadel Factors (i.e. presence or absence of testes or ovaries)

(iii) Genital Factors (including internal sex organs) (iv) Psychological factors

Concluding that the respondent, (April Ashley), had been shown to have an XY chromosome, and therefore to be of the male chromosomal sex, to have had testicles prior to an operation, and therefore to be of the male genital sex. To have had male external genitelia and therefore to be of male genital sex. It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest) and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means".

It was from such, now invalid, medical opinion, which the British Government used in their defence memorial in the Rees and Cossey cases. Further producing a letter from Prof. John Dewhurst to substantiate the myth even further, where he stated in his letter. "It might help to understand the medical approach to the management of transsexualism if I indicate that it is a disease, the cause of which we do not yet know".

It should be noted that it was the evidence of Prof. John Dewhurst in the Corbett case that was chosen by Judge Ormrod and was also the medical expert acting for Arthur Cameron Corbett, the Petitioner in that case.

I now produce the medical research evidence of Prof. Dr L.J.G Gooren, Internist/ Endocrinologist of the Free University Hospital, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Prof; Gooren is head of the Gender Team at the Free University Hospital Amsterdam. The gender team at that hospital is the most advanced research team of it kind in the world. Prof.Gooren also holds the only University Doctoral chair on transsexology in the world, which is at the Free University of Amsterdam.

The medical evidence to date shows that the sex of person is not fixed at birth as has been stated by out of date medical opinion presented by the British Government in the Rees and Cossey cases.

I also present a report on the treatment of transsexuals at the Gender Centre in the Academic Hospital of the Free University of Amsterdam, by Prof. Gooren, and a surgical report by D J Joris Hage, Consultant Plastic Surgeon at the Academic Hospital of the Free University Amsterdam. The reports are as follows: (see introduction part 3)

From the research reports it will be seen that transsexualism is not a disease as stated by Prof. John Dewhurst. But a clinical condition that a person is born with, and as such, persons with this condition must not be relegated to the dustbin of persons purported to he suffering from a psychological disease or dillusion of the mind. Such people must he given their legal rights and standing in society, of the sex they truly belong to, after necessary reassignment surgery has taken place.

I demand that the Commission take heed of this new information I have presented, and not of the out of date unproven information that was presented by the British Government in the Rees and Cossey cases.

MY LEGAL STATUS AND ACUSSATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM

In October 1991 I visited the British Consulate in Amsterdam to enquire over a new passport to reflect my status of a woman. During an interview with the Consul I was informed that it was not possible to be issued with a new passport reflecting my currant status at the time, nor would they accept a Letter of Deed Poll from a solicitor for a change of forenames. Their reasons being, that the issuing of passports to transsexuals in the United Kingdom, showing their female status, on production of a letter of Deed Poll from a solicitor, and a letter of acknowledgement from a qualified doctor that the bearer was a transsexual, is not legal outside of the United Kingdom. They further informed me that I would have to restrict myse1f to Dutch Law, and produce a court document denoting a change of forenames and sex status. Under Dutch Law such a document could not he given until I had undergone sex reassignment surgery, which would not he available to me until the coming� year 1992. I was also a British National as well. At the time my passport previously issued to me showed me as a male person, which was causing me acute social embarrassment, and legal problems. The legal problems this state of affairs caused me were. I was unable to register my property to my new status. I was unable to register myself in my new status at my local employment bureau. I was unable to register myself in my new status at my local social security offices. I was unable to register myself in my new status at the department of foreign police. I was unable to make an official change in my bank account to my new status. I was unable to register myself for employment as a woman.

The results of this had placed me in the position of being an ambiguous person, causing me severe mental stress, eroding my work possibilities and placing me in financial difficulties. The actions of the British Authorities, by refusing me rights that already are accorded to transsexuals of British Rationality, amount to mental Cruelty, and I accuse them of having broken Article.3.of the Convention for The Protection of Human Rights. Which states. "No one shall he subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". It can be inferred that this article pertains only to the treatment of people who are incarcerated in prison for whatever the reasons may be. But it infers also to being, "Subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The actions of the British Authorities, refusing to issue me with an identity document which was my right to have and the subsequent results, were in effect subjecting- me to inhuman and degrading treatment on a social level, which was not necessary.

Since my legal status was changed through a Court of Law, here in the Netherlands during August of 1992, this change also included being issued with a new Birth Certificate on which there is an amendment showing my legal status of a woman. The original record of my birth is on that certificate and has net been erased, but it has no more legal relevance to my status now. I made demands for this amendment to be inscribed in the Registers of Births in the United Kingdom, but this was refused. The British Government refuses to even recognise my amended birth certificate, which was done through a Court of Law. By my birth certificate, my new one, I am legally recognised as a woman throughout the world, except by my own country of origin of which I am still a national. In effect I cannot return to my own country in my legal status as a woman and enjoy my legal rights as a woman, which is in effect placing me in forced exile. I accuse the British Government of breaking Article.3.of Protocol No. 4. of The Convention of Human Rights, which states. "No one shall be expelled by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national".

It may be argued that the British Government, have not expelled me from the territory of which I am a national, and the British Government may argue this as well. But by not recognising my female status, on my return to take up residence there once again, is in effect placing me into forced exile. Which in effect is a form of forced expulsion from the territory of which I am a national. And in a manner deprives me from entering my own country in my legal status as a woman, which has been accorded to me by qualified doctors and endorsed by a court of law. The United Kingdom has no laws within its judicial system to enforce such medical demands and to date refuse to make such laws.

Not only has a refusal been made to recognise the legal change on my birth certificate, but it has been stateto me by the OPCS (Office of Population Census and Surveys), that my birth certificate and changes to it come under British Law and not Dutch Law. This is a direct interference in my private life, of which they have no right to involve themselves, but they are prepared to do so in detriment to my private life.

I accuse the British Government of breaking Article.8.of The Convention of Human Rights, which states, "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

The refusal of the British Government, via a public body namely the OPCS, to recognise my legally amended birth certificate, and to inscribe that legal amendment within the Birth Registers, is an interference in my private life, and placing me in an ambiguous legal situation. Neither does my legally amended birth certificate affect in any way British national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country. Neither does it pose any threat to the health, morals, rights and freedoms of other British Citizens of the United Kingdom. The British Government may argue that, according to their legal definitions regarding a person's sex, and the 1953 Births and Deaths Act, they are correct in refusing to

amend my birth certificate, and to recognise my legal status as a woman and recite the Corbett doctrine, concerning a persons legally recognised sex, and may refer hack to the Rees and Cossey cases. But I have shown proof enough that the Corbett case was deliberately set up to infringe upon a transsexual's rights and freedoms. That the medical evidence is no longer valid. It was misused in the Rees and Cossey cases, and that the 1953 Births and Deaths Act has no impediment within it to stop a transsexual from having an amendment concerning their name and sex to be added to the Birth Registers and the birth Certificate. It has already been done after the 1953 Act was passed and therefore I see no impediment to an official amendment being placed on my birth certificate, in the Registers of Birth and Deaths in the United Kingdom.

On the 21st of October 1993 1 wrote a letter to the OPCS for a clearer understanding of the English Law, concerning a contract of marriage that I was preparing to enter into, with a man of the Netherlands Nationality. I had stated quite clearly that my marriage would be totally legal under Dutch Law, and as I was still ethnically a British Subject, and me and my husband made the decision to move our marital home to the United Kingdom. What would our status be within English law. The answer was quite clear, that it would not be recognised in English law. This brings into question British refusal to accept Dutch Marriages, which are legally recognised throughout Europe and the world. It a1so opens up a serious breach of European Community 1aw an, regarding the recognition of citizens socially accepted standards involving family life, and interference within family life.

On this I accuse the British Government of breaking Article.12. of the Convention of Human Rights, which states, "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing this right". It may be argued that having been born a transsexual I am not regarded as a woman, according to the meanings of Article 12, and this is how the British Government may argue on this issue as they did in the Rees and Cossey cases. But that argument is anomalous to the fact that I am medically regarded as a woman, and legally so. Any denial of my legal rights to marry the man of my choice, and to found and enjoy a family life, is an infringement of my rights under Article 12. Especially when my rights in respect to marriage and family life are respected elsewhere but not in my own country of origin. The attitude of the British Government also opens up questions of the rights of other EEC nationals, who are legally recognised as woman and legally married to a man of their choice. That the husband in such a marriage were to decide to go to the United Kingdom and hear about the laws regarding transsexuals in the United Kingdom, and his wife being originally of transsexual birth. He could at any time put his wife aside and enter into a second marriage with another woman without even going through a divorce action. But on his return to his own country he would be open to arrest on charges of bigamy. If he decided to divorce his wife in the United Kingdom, his marriage would be declared null and void and of no effect, under the Corbett doctrine. His wife could not even demand alimony, as she would be declared a man under English Law.

English law in this respect contravenes basic laws regarding family rights of citizens of the European Community, of which they are a member state.

Further to this the British Governments deliberate refusal to recognise my rights as a woman in all aspects of life contravene Article. 14 of the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states, "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall he secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religious, political or other opinion national, or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status".

As I have already stated I am medically and legally a woman, which British Government will not accept. Their actions in doing so are taking away from me my enjoyment, rights and freedoms of my sex status, which have been legally given to me and can be proven by documentation, such documents which the Commission already have.

The British Government also by using� the Corbett doctrine as a reason for refusing to accept my legally changed sex status are misusing that doctrine on the base of my birth which was recorded at the time as being male. As I have stated before the verdict of that case is unsafe to use in the light of medical knowledge known at this time.

Article.17 of the Convention states, "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person, any right to engage in any activity, or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention".

The British Government by refusing to recognise my legal status as a woman and my rights to enjoy my status as such in my own country are aiming to destroy my rights and freedoms as set down in the convention.

Other Member states of the European Community do recognise the full lega1 rights of transsexuals after sex reassignment surgery, to the sex their bodies have been physically corrected to. Resolution 1117 1989 of the European Parliament specifically demands this. The British Government refuse to abide by this Resolution, nor have the British Government debated this Resolution, as they should have done after it was passed by the European Parliament. This document now sits in the archives for such documents in London. To my knowledge Cabinet Ministers in the British Parliament have never seen this document. Which can only mean that it has been deliberately withheld by persons of lower civil service status, who for their own reasons of prejudice do not wish that document to be seen by Cabinet Ministers, or by members of the public who have a vested interest in its contents. I enclose a copy of this document where it can be clearly seen, that refusal of the British Government to recognise a transsexuals reassigned sex status contravenes Article 2 (E) which specifically

demands correction of the sex status in the Birth Certificate. I enclose a copy also of Recommendation 1117 1989 from the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This document is directly related to Resolution 1117 of the European Parliament, and it is specifically stated, that contravention of a transsexual's right to amend the sex status on their birth certificate, is in contravention of Article 14 of the Convention.

Conclusions

Laws are not there to he only laws, but they create the rules within a country to protect people, and to organise a normal way of life. In this case the law is only an administrative fact, between one single, person and the Government of the United Kingdom. A change of this law will have no positive or negative affects for other persons.

I accuse the Government of the United Kingdom of having broken Articles 3. 8. 12. 14 and Protocol.No. 14 Article.3.of the European Convention of Human Rights to my detriment as a British National and citizen and in doing so have broken Article. 17 of the Convention, by refusing to recognise my legal status as a woman in my own country of origin and birth and as such are aiming to destroy my rights and freedoms as set down in the Convention. I demand that they be found guilty of having broken these Articles, to my detriment as a person, and it must be demanded of them that they correct the legal situation within the United Kingdom, that has caused ambiguity to my civil and legal status as a woman, and that I be afforded the same legal rights as any other woman in the United Kingdom.

Signed this day Friday 3. December. 1993

By me. Rachel Joanna Louise Horsham